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This paper  provides  an examination  of  the  ethics  of  disease  eradication  policies.  It examines  three  argu-
ments  that have been  advanced  for thinking  that  eradication  is  in  some  way  ethically  exceptional  as  a
policy  goal.  These  are  (1) global  eradication  has  symbolic  importance,  (2)  disease  eradication  is a  global
public  good  and  (3)  disease  eradication  is  a  form  of  rescue.  It argues  that  none  of  these  provides  a  good  rea-
son  to think  that  individuals  have  special  duties  to facilitate  eradication  campaigns,  or that  public  health
authorities  have  special  permissions  to pursue  them.  But the fact that  these  arguments  fail does  not
entail  that  global  disease  eradication  is  ethically  problematic,  or  that  it  should  not be  undertaken.  Globalymbolic value
thics
eradication  of  a disease,  if successful,  is  a way  of providing  an  enormous  health  beneﬁt  that  stretches  far
into  the  future.  There  is  no  need  to  reach  for the  idea  that  there  is  a  special  duty  to eradicate  disease;  the
same  considerations  that  are  in play  in  ordinary  public  health  policy  – of  reducing  the  burden  of disease
equitably  and  efﬁciently  –  sufﬁce  to make  global  disease  eradication  a compelling  goal  where doing  so
is  feasible.
ublis© 2014  The  Author.  P
. Introduction
Global eradication of disease has ﬁred the imagination since the
ntroduction of vaccination, a possibility that Jefferson brilliantly
xpressed in his letter to Jenner: ‘Medicine has never before pro-
uced any single improvement of such utility.  . . Future nations will
now by history only that the loathsome smallpox has existed and
y you has been extirpated’ [1]. Whilst it was over 170 years before
efferson’s dream was realised, smallpox was indeed globally erad-
cated by the end of the 1970s, and remains an iconic achievement
f the twentieth century.
In general, to eradicate a disease is to reduce to zero the inci-
ence of the disease through deliberate efforts [2]. To eradicate a
isease globally is to remove the disease threat from the whole
orld, permanently: in a recent consensus deﬁnition, “the world-
ide absence of a speciﬁc disease agent in nature as a result of
eliberate control efforts that may  be discontinued where the agent
s judged no longer to present a signiﬁcant risk from extrinsic
ources (e.g. smallpox)” [3].
This paper is concerned with the ethics of global disease erad-
cation. No one could reasonably deny that the global eradication
f smallpox, which had been a major cause of morbidity and mor-
ality for thousands of years, was a good thing. To this extent, the
thics of eradication is straightforward. However, it is important to
∗ Tel.: +44 2076790213.
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264-410X/© 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article uhed  by Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
counterbalance this ethical commonplace with the recognition that
there were a number of failed and expensive eradication campaigns
in the twentieth century, including yellow fever, yaws and malaria
[4]. In some cases – like yellow fever – the disease should probably
not have been a candidate for eradication attempts in the ﬁrst place,
as it has an animal reservoir. In other cases, the failure may  more
accurately reﬂect the intrinsic difﬁculty of globally eradicating a
disease, even where it is correctly judged to be technically feasible
to do so. Factors responsible for this high level of difﬁculty include
the degree of international coordination and cooperation over a
prolonged period that are required for successful global eradication
campaigns, the challenges of ensuring that enough individuals con-
tinue to be vaccinated to maintain herd protection everywhere in
the often long period between the disease being eradicated locally
and being eradicated globally, and the continual risk that cases
will be exported back into territories that were previously free of
the disease as a result of war  or political instability [5]. The long
endgame of the polio eradication campaign provides a vivid exam-
ple. The World Health Assembly committed to the eradication of
polio in 1988, with eradication originally scheduled to be com-
pleted by the year 2000. Recent instability has seen an increase in
the number of countries exporting wild poliovirus, a WHO  decla-
ration of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, and
doubts about the achievability of the most recent target date of
2018.
Eradication campaigns differ markedly from standard medical
treatments, and even from standard vaccination campaigns, in the
way that their burdens and beneﬁts are distributed. In standard
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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ontexts of medical treatment, the expectation is that the recipi-
nt of the treatment will be its main beneﬁciary; to give just one
xample, the International Code of Medical Ethics states that “a
hysician shall act in the patient’s best interest when providing
edical care” [6]. In standard vaccination campaigns, the expecta-
ion that the individual person vaccinated is the main beneﬁciary
emains, but such campaigns also aim to create spillover beneﬁts
o others from herd protection.
As a global eradication campaign moves closer to success, less
nd less of the expected beneﬁts of a vaccination will accrue to
he person vaccinated, and more and more to the world at large
hrough the elimination of the health threat from the environ-
ent. As the number of cases of the disease approaches zero, the
xpected beneﬁt to individuals who are vaccinated may  become
ess than the expected costs, if the vaccine itself poses at least a
inimal risk [7]. It is sobering to realise that there were between
00 and 300 deaths in childhood as a result of complications such
s encephalitis following smallpox vaccination in the US between
948 and 1965, but only one US death from smallpox in this period
8]. Whilst the risks of the oral polio vaccine are much smaller than
hose from the smallpox vaccine, they are far from inﬁnitessimal.
t is thus not immediately clear that a global vaccine-based eradi-
ation campaign could be successfully completed if all healthcare
rofessionals took literally the demand that each intervention they
rovide should be in the best interest of each patient considered as
n individual.
Even if it will be against the self-interest of some individuals
o be vaccinated, this does not entail that eradication campaigns
re unethical. Eradication campaigns are large-scale policy inter-
entions. No one expects that an ethically acceptable government
olicy must be conducive to the best interests of each person con-
idered as an individual [9]. Indeed, government policies frequently
llow suffering and death to occur in the pursuit of broader social
oals, without these policies being thought to be automatically
nethical on this basis. For example, road trafﬁc accidents are a
ajor cause of morbidity and mortality in every country. It would
e possible to signiﬁcantly reduce the number of deaths by greatly
educing speed limits – but both governments and the vast majority
f their citizens take the view that doing so would be disproportion-
te given the economic beneﬁts of fast road transportation, and the
mportance of personal liberty. To the extent that eradication cam-
aigns are compared to ordinary medical practice they may  look
thically problematic, but to the extent that they are compared to
ublic policy contexts such as transport they may  seem relatively
nproblematic.
Which is the right frame to bring to the ethical consideration
f eradication policies? This article provides an initial answer, by
xamining whether there is anything that is ethically exceptional
bout eradication [10]. If there is, we should expect eradication
olicies to be subject to sui generis ethical considerations; if there
s not, we should expect standard approaches to the ethics of public
ealth policy to be sufﬁcient. I begin by examining three arguments
hat have been put forward for thinking that eradication is in some
ay special as a policy goal. These are (1) that global eradication
as symbolic importance; (2) disease eradication is a global public
ood, and (3) disease eradication is a form of rescue. I argue that
one of these arguments succeeds in showing that eradication is
ui generis as a policy goal. None of these arguments provides a rea-
on for thinking that public health authorities have special duties
o pursue eradication campaigns, or that individuals have special
uties to facilitate them. I then argue that the fact that these argu-
ents fail does not entail that global disease eradication is ethically
roblematic, or that it should not be undertaken. Global eradication
f a disease, if successful, is a way of providing an enormous health
eneﬁt that stretches far into the future. There is no need to reach
or the idea that there is a special duty to eradicate disease; the014) 7179–7183
same considerations that are in play in ordinary public health pol-
icy – of reducing the burden of disease equitably and efﬁciently –
sufﬁce to make global disease eradication a compelling goal where
doing so is feasible.
2. The symbolic value argument
Eradication is often thought to have an important symbolic
value. The tangible goal of eradicating polio has energised donors
– such as members of the Rotary Club – for many years. Margaret
Chan, the Director General of the WHO, put it thus in a speech to
the Rotary International Convention in 2008, ‘We  have to prove
the power of public health. The international community has so
very few opportunities to improve this world in genuine and lasting
ways. Polio eradication is one’ [11].
It is sometimes argued that this symbolic value makes eradica-
tion an ethically special case – and hence that eradication policies
should be pursued over and above the actual health beneﬁts they
provide. Certainly, as we  explore in more detail later, eradication
policies need to stay the course, and large-scale success stories like
smallpox help to make the goal seem achievable. But this is merely
to say that eradication requires a ﬁrm long-term commitment if it
is to be successful, rather than to take the symbolic value of erad-
ication to be a reason to undertake such a policy in the ﬁrst place.
The symbolic value of eradication does not create ethical duties by
itself. Even if it is agreed that eradication has a high symbolic value
for many individuals, this does not provide a reason for thinking
that anyone has an additional ethical duty to facilitate eradica-
tion campaigns by agreeing to be vaccinated, or that governments
have an additional permission to do things that would other-
wise constitute a violation of someone’s rights, such as enforcing
vaccination.
If the person to be vaccinated agrees that disease eradication has
high symbolic value, then it seems plausible to suppose that she
would be willing to take the steps necessary in her own  conduct to
facilitate disease eradication, and to allow others to interfere with
her life for this purpose. But the operative moral principle here is
informed consent, and the symbolic value of eradication plays only
a derivative role. If someone does not think that disease eradication
has an important symbolic value, it is difﬁcult to see how the fact
that it had symbolic reason for others could either generate a moral
duty for her to subject herself to risk, or a permission for others to
coerce her in order to preserve this symbolic value.
When symbolic values are weighed in the balance against things
that have intrinsic value, then the merely symbolically valuable
must give way. We  can see this clearly if we  take something that
uncontroversially has only a symbolic value, such as the US ﬂag.
Suppose that a factory in China that makes US ﬂags for the export
market catches ﬁre by accident. Passers-by, who  do not personally
endorse the symbolic value of the US ﬂag, would have no duty to
endanger themselves to prevent the ﬂags from being immolated.
A committed US patriot might conceivably believe that he had a
reason to rescue the ﬂags, but even in this case, it would be ethi-
cally indefensible to choose to rescue the ﬂags instead of rescuing
a human being [12].
3. The global public goods argument
Barrett argues that global eradication of disease is a key exam-
ple of a global public good – a good that is both non-excludable
and non-rival: ‘Once provided, no country can be prevented from
enjoying a global public good, nor can any country’s enjoyment
of the good impinge on the consumption opportunities of other
countries. When provision succeeds, global public goods make peo-
ple everywhere better off’ [13].
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In other contexts where public goods need to be provided it
s usually taken for granted that communities may  legitimately
equire their members to contribute to the provision of these goods
egardless of whether so doing is in the best interests of each person
onsidered as an individual. Obvious examples would include jury
ervice or paying one’s taxes. So it might be thought that the mere
act that eradication is a global public good is sufﬁcient to show that
here are special ethical duties to undertake disease eradication
olicies.
However, this claim looks dubious. First, obligations to do one’s
air share towards providing a public good are usually articulated
n the context of an ongoing understanding of political community,
n which each person has already beneﬁted from social coopera-
ion. It is considerably more challenging to establish that there is a
lobal community of a type that is sufﬁcient to ground obligations
n individuals to ensure the provision of global public goods.
Second, even leaving this difﬁculty on one side, it is unclear that
he status of disease eradication as a public good sets it apart from
olicies of disease control. Risk reductions in general would plau-
ibly appear to be public goods, as they are usually nonrival and
on-excludable. If so, the global public goods argument does noth-
ng to support policies of risk elimination (eradication) over risk
eduction (control). If the global public goods theorist wishes to
aintain that eradication alone, and not mere risk reduction is a
lobal public good, then she needs to explain why.
In the above quotation, Barrett suggests that it is the universality
f the beneﬁt that is key, and it is this that allows Barrett to say that
people everywhere are better off” as a result of the global pub-
ic good. However, it is unclear in what sense people everywhere
eneﬁt from the eradication of a disease such as guinea worm. The
ost obvious answer is that there is a current health threat that
ould be removed from the environment, and so everyone would
e beneﬁted by living in a safer environment. However, the degree
o which the environment is made safer, and the ways in which
t is made safer, and for whom need to be speciﬁed. In this case
t is unclear in what way  citizens of a country that did not in any
ase have guinea worm (for instance the UK) would be beneﬁted
y global eradication of the disease. Or if this is a beneﬁt, then it is
nclear that it is a large and signiﬁcant beneﬁt for those individuals.
In addition, it would be puzzling to claim that a risk reduction for
 particular disease is not a global public good, but an elimination
f that risk is. All human beings will die at some point or other. So
ven if one particular disease is eradicated, it will still be the case
hat everyone will die of some disease or other. So whilst it might
e possible to conceptualise the elimination of a threat to health as
 global public good, it is unclear why we should think of the reduc-
ion of a particular risk to health to zero to be specially signiﬁcant,
here there are still many risks to health in the environment. In
ither case, the appeal to eradication as a global public good does
ittle to justify either the claim that individuals have special duties
o facilitate eradication campaigns, or that public health authorities
ave special permissions to pursue them.
. Is eradication a form of rescue?
Claudia Emerson argues that the duty to rescue provides the
ain reason to adopt plans to eradicate disease:
The duty to rescue obliges one to rescue someone in distress
provided one has the ability to do so, and doing so does not
require excessive sacriﬁce. . . Consider the case of polio, where
it is projected that the failure to complete eradication will result
in 4 million children contracting paralytic polio over the next
twenty years. . . Failure to eradicate in this case is synonymous
with a failure to rescue, given that we have the means to save
those 4 million children from the harm of polio [14].014) 7179–7183 7181
It is important to distinguish between obligations of rescue and
more general obligations of beneﬁcence. Common sense morality
takes obligations of rescue to be much more stringent than those
of beneﬁcence. Rescue cases involve identiﬁable individuals who
are in peril now. Saving miners who  are now trapped underground
would be a rescue, but upgrading pit machinery to reduce the risk
that accidents will happen in the future would be beneﬁcence, but
not rescue.
The chief ethical debate in this area is if the claims of those now
in peril really are more pressing than those of unidentiﬁable indi-
viduals who may  get into peril at some point in the indeterminate
future. Whilst some ethicists, such as Singer [15] argue that obli-
gations of beneﬁcence are just as stringent as those of rescue, they
do so on the basis of a moral argument, rather than – as Emer-
son appears to do – simply re-categorising a case of beneﬁcence as
one of rescue. If we followed Emerson’s usage, and allowed reduc-
ing risk to unidentiﬁable people over the long term to count as
rescuing them, then it seems that more or less anything would
count as a rescue. Most ordinary public health activity, such as
routine immunisation, or health and safety inspections of restau-
rants, would count as rescuing those unidentiﬁable individuals who
would then not contract disease.
It would seem better to acknowledge that the eradication cam-
paign does not rescue the people who do not get polio in the future.
Rather it permanently removes a health risk of a certain kind from
their environment, and so makes it the case that no one will in the
future have to be rescued from this health risk. This is an important
beneﬁt, and as the next section explores, is the ground for a more
successful argument in favour of eradication policies.
5. Eradication as ordinary health policy
Malaria currently creates a burden of disease of over 82 mil-
lion DALYs per year [16]. If an effective vaccine becomes available,
and a successful eradication campaign then reduced to zero the
burden of disease from malaria for the remainder of human exist-
ence, this would provide an extraordinarily large health beneﬁt
[17]. Whilst we have found no special reason to opt for eradica-
tion policies just as such, eradicating disease is clearly one way  of
meeting more general desiderata of public health policy – reducing
the burden of disease equitably and efﬁciently. Eradication policies
will sometimes have a more favourable balance of burdens and
beneﬁts than other competing health interventions – and in such
cases they should be chosen.
Standard cost effectiveness tools struggle to accurately account
for the beneﬁts of ordinary national vaccination campaigns [18].
Accounting for the beneﬁts of eradication campaigns is signiﬁcantly
more difﬁcult. In what follows, I shall aim to sketch some of these
additional problems, and argue that they should not stand in the
way of eradication campaigns.
The ﬁrst difﬁculty relates to uncertainty. It is extremely difﬁcult
to globally eradicate a disease. Only one such attempt has so far
succeeded in humans, so it would be unrealistic to think that any
given eradication campaign could be guaranteed success. Where an
eradication campaign fails it can fail more or less gracefully. It can
fail gracefully where, despite not leading to global eradication of a
disease, it leads to a signiﬁcant and sustained reduction in preva-
lence of the disease, or it can fail less gracefully, leaving no sustained
reduction in the prevalence of the disease, and a trail of negative
associations that makes it more difﬁcult to mount eradication cam-
paigns in the future. Constructing a model for the prospective cost
effectiveness of eradication campaigns is thus very challenging,
though progress is being made here [19].
Second, there are both ethical and cost effectiveness reasons for
thinking that eradication campaigns should aim to go big and go
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ast [20]. If an eradication campaign lingers around for a long time
n the “last mile”, the cost per QALY for preventing each additional
ase will go up exponentially. The same precautions still need to
e taken, and all the surveillance, but the number of people who
re actually suffering from the disease will be very small. It is at
his point that vaccine refusal is more likely to become a problem –
s individuals may  not unreasonably question whether they them-
elves stand to beneﬁt from the vaccination. Where policymakers
ake the view that eradication should continue to be pursued only
here the cost-per-QALY for each individual case remains within
olerable bounds, then they are likely to give up before the job has
nished – meaning that there will be continued ﬂare-ups of the dis-
ase, with the net result that the disease will never be eradicated
21].
Third, and most difﬁcult, there is a deep question about how to
eigh even successful eradication campaigns in the balance against
ther uses of healthcare resources. Disease eradication brings its
rue beneﬁts only over the long term, whilst healthcare spending
ends to focus on short to medium-term beneﬁts. If we assume that
t is equally as important to save a life in ﬁfty or a hundred years’
ime as it is to save one now, then it would seem that we  should
evote a very great proportion of our current healthcare resources
o eradication campaigns. As Murray [22] put this point in setting
ut the initial framework for the Global Burden of disease report:
if health beneﬁts are not discounted, then we may  conclude that
100% of resources should be invested in any disease eradication
plans with ﬁnite costs as this will eliminate inﬁnite streams of
DALYs which will outweigh all other health investments that do
not result in eradication.
Murray drew the conclusion that in order to avoid this paradox,
uture health beneﬁts should be subject to a discount rate. This
onclusion seems surprising: if the expected total health beneﬁts
f eradicating a disease such as malaria really were vastly greater
han, say improving control of diabetes, would not this be a strong
rgument in favour of eradication?
Whilst the terrain here is complex, there seems to be no good
eason to apply large discount rates to future health beneﬁts, even
f there are good reasons for signiﬁcantly discounting other future
oods [23]. It is standard in economics to apply a discount rate
o commodities, because the price of most commodities falls over
ime relative to the return we could get on an investment at a
ank. This discounting model assumes that the increased amount
f commodities that could be bought in the future with the money
nvested has the same value for wellbeing as the smaller bundle we
an buy now. However health gains and avoidance of death would
eem to contribute a constant amount to wellbeing whenever they
ccur. So these reasons for discounting commodities do not imply
hat future health should be discounted [24].
Economists also argue in favour of a discount rate on the grounds
f uncertainty. There is a chance that the disease will no longer be
 problem in the future and if so, it would be a waste of resources
o spend money now on eradicating it, rather than treating another
ealth condition. There is also a chance that there will not be any
uman beings around to still gain the beneﬁt of the disease’s being
radicated – in which case expending the time and effort now to
omplete the last mile of the disease’s eradication would turn out
o have been futile. Notice that this time discounting is due to epis-
emic uncertainty, and not to any intrinsic lesser importance of lives
n the future. Because of this, it seems implausible to think that this
iscount rate should be large, as “even a 1% discount rate implies
hat there is a 50% chance that the world will end in 69.7 years”
25].
It is possible to claim that lives in the future are intrinsically less
mportant than those now – quite separate from the thoughts about
ncertainty. Within the economics and philosophy literature, this is014) 7179–7183
known as pure time discounting: discounting the value of beneﬁts
and harms in the future solely for the reason that they are in the
future. Most philosophers have followed Ramsey’s lead in thinking
that pure discounting “is ethically indefensible and arises merely
from the weakness of the imagination” [26]. The reason for thinking
this is simple: there seems to be no reason to think that the mere
fact that suffering or death is proximal in time provides a reason to
prioritise it, any more than there is a reason to think that suffering
or death is proximal in space does. It is interesting to note that the
latest version of the Global Burden of Disease Report [27] no longer
features time discounting of health improvements.
The philosopher Derek Parﬁt [28] provides a powerful way of
conceptualising what is at stake here. Suppose we are thinking
about three scenarios for the future of malaria.
1. Status quo.
2. A malaria control campaign reduces the current burden of
malaria by 99%.
3. An eradication campaign globally eradicates malaria.
It is obvious that, other things being equal, 3 is better than 2, and
2 is better than 1. But how much better is the successful eradication
campaign than the control campaign, which merely reduces the
burden of its disease to 1% of its current level? Many people would
assume that the successful eradication campaign is only marginally
better than the successful control measures. But this is to ignore
the fact that if we  simply reduce the current burden of malaria by
99%, then malaria will (absent some further attempt at eradication,
or dramatic change to the environment) continue to cause illness
and death for the rest of human history. The likely beneﬁts of the
eradication campaign are thus huge in comparison to the control
campaign.
6. Conclusion
I have suggested that the main arguments for thinking that erad-
ication is an ethically exceptional goal are weak. But my  aim has
not been to oppose eradication as a policy goal, but to give a better
explanation of why it is compelling. I think that the main reason
for advocating eradication (in cases where it is feasible to do so) is
none other than the future health beneﬁts that it provides. There is
no good reason to discount future health beneﬁts for reasons other
than those of uncertainty; and discounts as a result of uncertainty
should be relatively small. And once we  recognise this, then the
sheer scale of the health beneﬁts that eradication offers gives us a
good reason to attempt it in cases where it is judged feasible.
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